We develop a model in which two insurers and two health care providers compete for a fi xed mass of policyholders. Insurers compete in premium and o er coverage against financial consequences of health risk. They have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to establish a health care...

We investigate how formularies used by pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) can affect manufacturer rebates for branded drugs. We first present a theoretical model of multidimensional contracting in which a PBM negotiates with drug manufacturers over menus of formulary-contingent rebate payments and...

We develop a model in which two insurers and two health care providers compete for a fixed mass of policyholders. Insurers compete in premium and offer coverage against financial consequences of health risk. They have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to establish a health care...

We examine vertical integration and exclusive vertical restraints in health-care markets where insurers and hospitals bilaterally bargain over contracts. We employ a bargaining model in a concentrated health-care market of two hospitals and two health insurers competing on premiums. Without...

In November 1994, Winnipeg’s nine urban hospitals announced that they agreed to pursue opportunities to share four common support services - food services, material management, biomedical waste disposal and laundry to determine the potential for improving efficiency, reducing duplication and...

We investigate the impact of hospital system membership on negotiations between hospitals and managed care organizations (MCOs). Previous research finds that system hospitals secure higher reimbursements by exploiting local market concentration. By leveraging system membership in the bargaining...

De nombreuses études analysent les phénomènes de fusion en prenant en compte les variables stratégiques des firmes telles que les prix ou les quantités de vente. Or, peu d’études font le lien entre les stratégies de promotion et les fusions. Pourtant, les dépenses mondiales de...

We measure provider coverage networks for plans on the Massachusetts health insurance exchange using a two measures: consumer surplus from a hospital demand system and the fraction of population hospital admissions that would be covered by the network. The two measures are highly correlated, and...

We analyze exclusive contracts between health care providers and insurers in a model where some consumers choose to stay uninsured. In case of a monopoly insurer, exclusion of a provider changes the distribution of consumers who choose not to insure. Although the foreclosed care provider remains...