The paper investigates the stability of the International Environmental Agreement in a model of emission reduction. We consider a two stage game, in which in the first stage each country decides whether or not to join the agreement while, in the second stage, the quantity of emissions reduction...

We model an International Environmental Agreement as a two stages game: during the first stage each country decides whether or not to join the agreement while, in the second stage, the quantity of emissions reduction is choosen. Players determine their abatement levels in a dynamic setting,...

Mutual aid among villagers in developing countries is often the only means of insuring against economic shocks. We use 'lab-in-the-field experiments' in Cambodian villages to study solidarity in established and newly resettled communities. Both communities are part of a land distribution project...

This paper discusses the role of transfers in a non-cooperative environment. If reselling in-kind-transfers involves some retrading costs, in-kind transfers are supposed to realise at least some of the mutual bargaining gains which would be left unexploited by mere use of monetary payments....

Mutual aid among villagers in developing countries is often the only means of insuring against economic shocks. We use "lab-in-the-field experiments" in Cambodian villages to study social cohesion in established and newly resettled communities. Both communities are part of a land distribution...

Economics