This paper studies repeated games with incomplete information on one side and equal discount factors for both players. The payoffs of the informed player I depend on one of two possible states of the world, which is known to her. The payoffs of the uninformed player U do not depend on the state...

The paper generalizes a costly state verification model along two dimensions: 1) diversity of opinions, and 2) endogenous formation of a financial intermediary, modeled as a multilender coalition. In contrast with previous contributions (e.g. [35] and [36]), our model can account for the...

Two well-known, but seemingly contradictory, features of exchange rates are that they are close to a random walk while at the same time exchange rate changes are predictable by interest rate differentials. In this paper we investigate whether these two features of the data may in fact be...

Cooperation in real-world dilemmas takes many forms. We introduce a class of two-player games that permits two distinct ways to cooperate in the repeated game. One way to cooperate is to play cutoff strategies, which rely solely on a player's private value to defection. The second cooperative...

This paper unifies the theories of Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation in a single framework. Environments considered are such that each agent's characteristics include, in addition to a specification of his private information, a commonly known type parameter, while both attributes...

The harshest criticism of econometrically based policy evaluation is undoubtedly the sensitivity of its conclusions to assumptions concerning the information available to policy-makers or to misspecification of the econometric models used in the evaluation. Economists appear to have accepted...

For Bayesian games of strategic complementarities, we provide a constructive proof of the existence of a greatest and a least Bayes-Nash equilibrium - each one in strategies monotone in type - if the payoff to a player displays increasing differences in own action and the profile of types, and...

We characterize full implementation of social choice sets in mixedstrategy Bayesian equilibrium. Our results concern both exact and virtual mixed implementation. For exact implementation, we identify a strengthening of Bayesian monotonicity, which we refer to as mixed Bayesian monotonicity. It...