This paper establishes a B-core existence result for normal form TU games. …

We study equilibrium in games in which each player uses the procedure in which he associates a consequence with each of …

In this paper we study the players' reasoning in nomral form games. To this end we generalize the concept of objective …

Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a …

Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a …

Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a …

properness and a robust Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the …

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose … players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to … rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social …

This paper accepts the premise that positive sum games exist in all dimensions of North-South economic contacts but …