Succeeding Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995) and Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato (1997), we define two types of natural mechanisms quantity and price-quantity types, in convex production economies, and characterize the class of Pareto subsolutions doubly implementable in Nash and strong Nash equilibria...

Succeeding Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995) and Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato (1995), we define several conditions of natural mechanisms in production economies, and proposed two types of natural mechanisms, that is, the quantity and price-quantity types.

Succeeding Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995) and Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato (1995), we define several conditions of natural mechanisms in production economies, and proposed two types of natural mechanisms, that is, the quantity and price-quantity types.

We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first showthat in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. We...

This paper examines the implementation of two public ownership solutions in convex production economies with differentiable production functions. The two public ownership solutions we focus on are the proportional and equal benefit solutions. Two "natural" mechanisms which doubly implement the...

This paper examines the implementation of two public ownership solutions in convex production economies with differentiable production functions. The two public ownership solutions we focus on are the proportional and equal benefit solutions. Two "natural" mechanisms which doubly implement the...

This paper examines the implementation of various solutions in differentiable concave production economies with one privately owned input, one output, and publicly owned production technology. The public ownership solutions we focus on are the Proportional Solution (PS) and the Equal Benefit...

This paper examines the implementation of various solutions in differentiable concave production economies with one privately owned input, one output, and publicly owned production technology. The public ownership solutions we focus on are the Proportional Solution (PS) and the Equal Benefit...

This paper completely characterizes two public ownership solutions in convex production economies, known respectively as the Proportional Solution (PR), and the Equal Benefit Solution (EB), by adopting the axioms Moulin (1990a,b) discussed and introducing two other axioms, Pareto Independence...

This paper completely characterizes two public ownership solutions in convex production economies, known respectively as the Proportional Solution (PR), and the Equal Benefit Solution (EB), by adopting the axioms Moulin (1990a,b) discussed and introducing two other axioms, Pareto Independence...