In this paper we study the optimal import policy in an oligopolistic market with a given number of quantity-setting firms. In the absence of fixed costs, we show that if the policy instrument is an import quota, the optimal policy is either free trade or autarky, while if the instrument is a...

Recent empirics suggest the relevance of transport cost reductions for world trade growth along with eliminations in protectionist trade barriers. To address the welfare effects of trade cost reductions in a context of `trade and the environment,' we develop a two-stage game model where...

Exports of agricultural commodities to developed countries play a significant role in the economies of many developing countries.  The elimination of import tariffs has the potential to benefit producers in the developing countries, but estimates of the extent of the gains from trade...

The paper studies a market of horizontally differentiated good under increasing return to scale and exogenous number of firms. Three concepts of equilibria are compared: Cournot, Bertrand and monopolistic competition. Under fairly general assumptions on consumer's preferences, it is shown that...

In a model of vertical product differentiation, duopolistic firms face qualitydependent costs and compete in quality and price in two segmented markets. Minimum quality standards, set uniformly or according to the principle of Mutual Recognition, can be used to increase welfare. The analysis...

This paper shows that environmental, labour and other standards can be effective strategic policy instruments even when they are strictly non-discriminatory. This is because standards can be set which the foreign producer optimally chooses not to meet, allowing the domestic producer to...

In a standard imperfect competition model, we endogenize the costs of production of firms in the increasing returns sector (IRS) via process R&D. We show that firms in the larger region in terms of demand invest more in R&D (i.e.: they are bigger in size and have lower marginal costs) than firms...

This paper studies the incentives that developing countries have to protect intellectual properties rights (IPR). On the one hand, free-riding on rich countries technology reduces their investment cost in R&D. On the other hand, firm that violates IPR cannot legally export in a country that...

This paper examines the strategic role of advertising subsidies in a third-country trade model in which two firms located in different countries export their products to a third country (Brander and Spencer (1985)). We first develop a basic model of advertising in oligopolistic industries in...

This paper extends the model of Brander and Spencer (1985) to study whether the simultaneous elimination of export subsidies is feasible. It is shown that the incentive for subsidizing exports to reoccur will exist when all subsidizing countries are forced to withdraw their subsidies on exports...