Corporate governance and competition law generate divergent incentives in the organization. This paper confronts these regulating tools in a gametheoretical approach of collusive behaviors in vertical organizations

[ger] Investition, Leistungsfähigkeit und Koordination im Unternehmen, . von Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, Philippe Michel, Jacques Thépot.. . Mit dem Investitionsmodell eines Unternehmens lassen sich zwei Arten von Verhaltensweisen miteinander vergleichen: die naive und die rationale...

Le but de cette communication est de proposer deux facteurs expliquant la pérennité de l’Église catholique en tant qu’organisation. Du côté de la demande, nous défendons l’idée selon laquelle le catholicisme occupe un positionnement central dans l’espace des attentes des croyants....

This paper explores the idea to regulate retailing industry through a tax on the store parking size. In Western economies, retailers use common resources (land use, road networks) contributing to the store accessibility that they do not pay for. This kind of free riding gives gross merchandisers...

We develop a game-theoretic model of doping which focuses on the economic aspects of competitive sports. According to the model, incentives for athletes to use doping increase when (i) the efficiency of the drug test system is low, (ii) the number of competitions during one season is high, (iii)...