We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...

This paper studies the efficiency of collusion between supervisors and supervisees. Building on Tirole (1986)’s results that deterring collusion with infinitely risk averse supervisors is impossible, while it is costless to do so under risk neutrality, we develop here a theory of collusion...

We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...

During the past two decades, Latin American countries have made pioneering efforts in reforming infrastructure services. The "first generation of reforms" encompassed widespread privatization, deregulation and restructuring of the provision of energy, water, transport and telecommunications...

[fre] Théorie des jeux et économie empirique : le cas des données issues d'enchères . par Jean- Jacques Laffont . Le présent article consiste en une revue des travaux appliqués sur données issues d'enchères. Nous passons en revue les principales prédictions des trois modèles de...

[fre] Information et économie publique par Jean- Jacques Laffont . La prise en compte du comportement stratégique des acteurs vis-à-vis de leur information privée et des inefficacités de la décision publique dues au jeu des groupes d'intérêt a conduit à une vision plus réaliste de...