In many industries, a regulator designs an auction to select ex-ante the firms that compete ex-post on the product market. This paper considers the optimal market structure when firms incur sunk costs before entering the market and when the government is not able to regulate firms in the market....

In this paper, we evaluate the scope of Chadwick’s claim on the superiority of competition for the market over competition in the market under incomplete information. We firstly characterize the expected outcome achieved under competition in the market at a Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium....

This paper focuses on recent theoretical contributions to the hospital price regulation literature. Besides the usual efficiency-rent extraction trade-off, some specific trade-off between quality enhancement and cost reduction effort or between efficiency and selection deterrence must be taken...

Public service motivation is often considered as an argument for low- powered incentive schemes in the public sector. In this paper, we characterize the optimal contract between a public regulator and an altruistic agent according to the degree of public service motivation, when the type of the...

Public service motivation is often considered as an argument for low- powered incentive schemes in the public sector. In this paper, we characterize the optimal contract between a public regulator and an altruistic agent according to the degree of public service motivation, when the type of the...

[eng] This paper analyses the consequences of the completion of the European Internal Market in public sector procurement. After a studiy of national purchasing pactices in public sector, the paper criticizes the Atkins report. Then the benefits of the internal market are analyzed by considering...

[fre] Malédiction du vainqueur et rationalité économique. . Cet article examine le phénomène de la malédiction du vainqueur dans les procédures d'appel d'offres. Un modèle de simulation permet de distinguer la malédiction (due à une erreur d'évaluation a priori de la valeur du bien...

[eng] Bertrand duopoly, asynmetric information and social welfare . . In this paper, we consider a market with two firms having a private information on their marginal cost. In this context of asynmetric information, we prove that a two stages mechanism is not optimal from a social welfare point...

[fre] Cet article considère les relations entre les hôpitaux et une autorité de tutelle (État ou assurance maladie) en situation de risque moral et d'antisélection lorsque la tutelle possède une fonction objectif quasi linéaire. Différents modes d'organisation sont envisagés : contrat...