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In this paper we analyze equilibria in competitive environments under constraints across players'' strategies. This means that the action taken by one player limits the possible choices of the other players. In this context the classical approach, Kakutani''s Fixed Point theorem, does not work....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160549
We investigate the relations between different types of perfect equilibrium, introduced by Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) for games with compact action spaces and continuous payoffs. Simon and Stinchcombe distinguish two approaches to perfect equilibrium in this context, the classical "trembling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160550
We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running timeof the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. We also show that this result...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160579
In multi-unit (procurement) auctions winning multiple contracts can lead to cost advantages due to synergies. As an example one can think of procurement auctions where construction firms have returns to scale for investments in specialized equipments and workers that are required in large-scale...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160584
This paper studies the sales of a single indivisible object where bidders have continuous valuations. In Grigorieva et al. [13] it was shown that, in this setting, query auctions necessarily allocate inefficiently in equilibrium. In this paper we propose a new sequential auction, called the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011202115
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005020749
The effect of replacing an agent in a two-person two-state finance economy by a more risk averse agent is studied. It is established under which conditions the other agent benefits or looses in equilibrium from dealing with a more risk averse agent. If one agent becomes more risk averse, then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010640132
The effect of replacing an agent in a two-person two-state finance economy by a more risk averse agent is studied. It is established under which conditions the other agent benefits or looses in equilibrium from dealing with a more risk averse agent. If one agent becomes more risk averse, then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502272
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413599
Following Vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome as well as a disagreement outcome: the interpretation is that the latter results if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011146939