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We analyse the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective ofefficient aggregation of voters’ private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory,this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between twoalternatives when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160314
A state, for instance a health state, is characterized by a number of attributes to each of which a level is assigned. A specific collection of numerical values, for instance utilities, for all possible states is called a situation. The main purpose of the paper is to develop a class of methods...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160340
Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2 by 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160376
In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a disc in theEuclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the disc. It is provedthat any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is a dictatorial. This framework models...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160393
We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences and initial endowments. We propose an extension of the so-called uniform rule and show that it is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160397
Bargaining problems are considered where the preferences of the bargainers deviate from expected utility but can be modelled according to rank dependent utility theory. Under rank dependent utility two factors influence the risk attitude of a decision maker: the utility function and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160407
In this paper we study three different types of loss aversion equilibria in bimatrix games. Loss aversion equilibria are Nash equilibria of games where players are loss averse and where the reference points – points below which they consider payoffs to be losses – are endogenous to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160442
The scope for optimal international coordination of indirect taxes is examined in a macroeconomic game-theoretic framework which encompasses two regionally integrated economies, which have a single goods market. In each country there are tax-financed non-tradeable public goods, while labor is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160472
We consider several related set extensions of the core and the anticore of games with transferableutility. An efficient allocation is undominated if it cannot be improved, in a specific way, bysidepayments changing the allocation or the game. The set of all such allocations is called...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160535
We consider bargaining games under the assumption that bargainers are loss averse, i.e. experience disutility from obtaining an outcome lower than some reference point. We follow the approach of Shalev (2002) by imposing the self-supporting condition on a solution. Given a bargaining game, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160548