We use a laboratory gift-exchange game to examine decisions made by groups under three different procedures that dictate how group members interact and reach decisions in comparison to individuals acting alone. We find that group decisions do deviate from those of individuals, but the direction...

The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, May 2007, Volume 89, Issue 2.

The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Volume 88, Number 3, August 2006.

In this paper, we use laboratory experiments to investigate how group identity and team decision-making processes might impact economic decisions. Our primary aim is to move the literature closer to an integrated model of group decision making through the use of an experimental design that...

The paper develops a model of repeated interaction between a buyer and a seller, which is then tested via laboratory experiments. The model allows for both formal and informal incentives in the contractual relationship between the parties. Formal incentives are explicit, performance-conditioned...

We use field experiments in Niger to investigate the nature and efficiency of contractual structures in market transactions between kossai vendors and cowpea grinders (key input suppliers). Three contractual structures were employed: gift contract, standard price contract and discretionary bonus...

We present designs for optimal contracts to solve the investment hold-up problem for perennial crops for the biofuel industry. A fixed-price contract is ex-ante efficient but renegotiation-proof for a limited range of discount parameters. A perfectly- indexed contract is both renegotiation-proof...