We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.

We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity,...

Preface -- General Aspects -- Aggregation and Voting -- Algorithms and Complexity -- Axiomatics -- Behavioral Aspects -- Fair Division -- Implementation -- Interpersonal Relations -- Law -- Matching and Markets -- New Technologies

We consider voting games induced by anonymous and top-unanimous social choice functions. The class of such social choice functions is quite broad, including every “t-refinement” of the Plurality Rule, Plurality with a Runoff, the Majoritarian Compromise and the Single Transferable Vote,...

We give a complete characterization of preference domains over which the plurality rule is Nash implementable. We show that the plurality rule fails Nash implementability on every domain except those which are "monotonically trivial".