on how many hours to work with obvious consequences for the household budget. We therefore model consumption and labor … that demand for public goods is characterized by three regimes. It is either determined by the preferences of one of the … on the spouses' relative wage rates (Split Might). These regimes imply a kinked nature of the couple's aggregate demand …

prove that demand for public goods is characterized by three regimes. It is either determined by the preferences of one of …

on how many hours to work with obvious consequences for the household budget. We therefore model consumption and labor … that demand for public goods is characterized by three regimes. It is either determined by the preferences of one of the … on the spouses' relative wage rates (Split Might). These regimes imply a kinked nature of the couple's aggregate demand …

on how many hours to work with obvious consequences for the household budget. We therefore model consumption and labor … that demand for public goods is characterized by three regimes. It is either determined by the preferences of one of the … on the spouses' relative wage rates (Split Might). These regimes imply a kinked nature of the couple's aggregate demand …

prove that demand for public goods is characterized by three regimes. It is either determined by the preferences of one of …

We study non cooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving … contributed public goods. Demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the …

We study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the … public goods. Demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the … general alternative. -- Nash equilibrium ; Intra-household allocation ; Slutsky symmetry …