This paper studies the optimal managerial compensation when the shareholders may invest in private protection to reinforce their protection. The optimal contract exhibits three tolls: the wage, the level of dividends (which is equivalent to the level of diversion) and the level of private...

This paper studies the optimal pricings of a congestible good when users are privately informed both on the valuation of the good and on their unit waiting costs. Hence, conflicts appear between incentives and individual rationality. We show that the textbook price is higher than that of the...

This paper studies multi-period public procurement when the acquisition of a single good over several periods is fixed once for all. The optimal mechanism is derived over two periods with temporal cost correlation. The most efficient firm delivers the good and gets informational rent at each...

This model captures one of the key elements of the value diversion controversy. Within a standard mixed model, we show that shareholders are better off if they allow a certain amount of diversion even if it generates a dead-weight loss.

This paper analyzes optimal contracting when an agent has private information before contracting and exerts hidden effort that stochastically affects the output. Additionally, the contract is constrained to satisfy the agentʼs ex post participation. We highlight three features of this model....

<marquage typemarq="gras"/> In this paper, we design the optimal procurement mechanisms when bidders are privately informed on efficiency and on observable but neither verifiable nor contractible quality. We show that most of the optimal procurement institutions are mixed procedure implying both separation and pooling....