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Fiscal federalism and endogenous lobbies' formation

Bordignon, Massimo; Colombo, Luca; Galmarini, Umberto - 2003

We study lobbying behavior by firms in a two-region economy, with either centralized or decentralized provision of … profit-enhancing local public goods. Firms compete either in the market, lobbying for public good provision once entered in a … market, or for the market, lobbying to gain ccess to it. When firms compete in the market, we show that lobbying is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509399

Fiscal Federalism and Endogenous Lobbies' Formation

Bordignon, Massimo; Colombo, Luca; Galmarini, Umberto - 2021

We study lobbying behavior by firms in a two-region economy, with either centralized or decentralized provision of … profit-enhancing local public goods. Firms compete either in the market, lobbying for public good provision once entered in a … market, or for the market, lobbying to gain access to it. When firms compete in the market, we show that lobbying is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319795

Accountability and Subnational Tax Autonomy : When Do Politicians Lose Fiscal Interest?

Sas, Willem - 2016

Devolving tax authority to lower-level jurisdictions in a federation is often argued to better align the actions of politicians with the wishes of voters. In this paper, we derive the conditions for tax autonomy to bring about local growth-enhancing policies - as the fiscal incentives approach...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994476

The political economy of EU enlargement and the Treaty of Nice

Heinemann, Friedrich - 2000

The paper applies standard public choice reasoning to the negotiations on EU enlargement and the Treaty of Nice. The starting point is the assumption that accession can only be successfully completed if the interests of decisive actors in present EU countries are respected. Decisive actors in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444905

The Political Economy of EU Enlargement and the Treaty of Nice

Heinemann, Friedrich - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014140974

Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization

Epstein, Gil S.; Gang, Ira N. - 2016

Governments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the government’s taxation levels. We examine the political economy of decentralized revenue-raising authority in light of social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539434

Government and cities : contests and the decentralization of decision making

Epstein, Gil S.; Gang, Ira N. - 2002

Governments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government's support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412469

Fiscal federalism, taxation and grants

Gonzalez-Eiras, Martín; Niepelt, Dirk - 2016

We propose a theory of tax centralization and inter governmental grants in politico-economic equilibrium. The cost of taxation differs across levels of government because voters internalize general equilibrium effects at the central but not at the local level. This renders the degree of tax...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011523762

Fiscal federalism, taxation and grants

Gonzalez-Eiras, Martín; Niepelt, Dirk - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011523838

Decentralized leadership

Silva, Emilson C. D. - 2016

This paper studies the efficiency of decentralized leadership in federations where selfish regional governments provide regional and federal public goods and the benevolent central government implements interregional earmarked and income transfers. Without residential mobility, unlimited...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524602

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