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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091692
Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature.For games with a coalition structure, the Shapley value also has been axiomatized in several ways.In this paper, we discuss a generalization of the Shapley value to the class of partition function form games.The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091748
In this paper we investigate the truth (more often the untruth) of seventeen commonly heard statements about tennis.We base our analysis on point-by-point data of almost 500 singles matches played at Wimbledon, 1992-1995.The seventeen hypotheses under consideration are: 1 A player is as good as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091764
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The implications of assuming that it is commonly known that players consider only admissible best responses are investigated.Within a states-of-the-world model where a state, for each player, determines a strategy set rather than a strategy the concept of fully permissible sets is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091831
In this paper we construct sets of marginal vectors of a TU game with the property that if the marginal vectors from these sets are core elements, then the game is convex.This approach leads to new upperbounds on the number of marginal vectors needed to characterize convexity.An other result is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091846
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This paper considers one machine job scheduling situations or sequencing problems, where clients can have more than a single job to be processed in order to get a final output.Moreover, a job can be of interest for different players. This means that one of the main assumptions in classic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091902
The identification of key players in a terrorist network can lead to prevention of attacks, due to efficient allocation of surveillance means or isolation of key players in order to destabilize the network. In this paper we introduce a game theoretic approach to identify key players in terrorist...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091910