The object of study is cooperation in joint projects, where agents may have different desired sophistication levels for the project, and where some of the agents may have low budgets.In this context questions concerning the optimal realizable sophistication level and the distribution of the...

This article presents a generalization of the equilibrium analysis for the simple two-player poker game with alternate bidding of Von Neumann and Morgenstern.It approximates optimal play for this game if it is played with a regular deck of 52 cards and it discusses some strategic insights.In...

We consider the problem of control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the decision makers into a structure of formal authority relationships.Within such a structure, decision makers act as principal to some decision makers, while they act as agent to other decision makers.We study...

Finite potential games have Nash equilibria in pure strategies.This note provides some results on the existence of equilibria or approximate equilibria if some players have infinite sets of strategies.

In this paper the structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games is analysed. It turns out that the classical result for the set of equilibria for bimatrix games, that it is a finite union of polytopes, is only valid for multicriteria games if one of the players only has...

Abstract: In this paper we provide a characterisation of the set of fall back equilibria for 2 x n bimatrix games. Furthermore, for this type of games we discuss the relation between the set of fall back equilibria and the sets of perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria. In order to do...

In this paper, we analyze a lobby game, modelled as an all-pay auction in which interest groups submit bids in order to obtain a political prize.The bids are restricted to be below a cap imposed by the government.For both an incomplete and a complete information setting we show the following...