This paper presents a theory of the allocation of authority in an organization in which centralization is limited by the agent's ability to disobey the principal. We show that workers are given more authority when they are costly to replace or do not mind looking for another job, even if they...

Many organizations attempt to manage agency problems not with incentive contracts but by keeping the principal involved in the decision process, that is, by limiting delegation. This paper develops a model to investigate the economics of several decision processes that are commonly used to set...

This paper presents evidence from parallel field experiments in China, Germany, and the United States. We contacted the mayor’s office in over 6,000 cities asking for information about procedures for starting a new business. Chinese and German cities responded to 36-37 percent requests;...

Do voters see democracy entirely as a game of self-interest in which one person’s gain is another’s loss, or do they also view it as a search for the common good, as some democracy theorists have long conjectured? Existing empirical research that assumes entirely private interests cannot...

This paper estimates to what extent proxy advice allows funds to vote as if they were informed. A fund’s vote is classified as “informed“ if the fund accessed the company’s proxy statement from the SEC’s Edgar website prior to voting. A fund’s proxy advisor, if any, is identified...

This paper investigates how often and under what conditions legislators vote in accordance with constituent opinion. The main innovation is to measure constituent opinion using referendum election returns. In a sample of 3,983 roll-call votes on 31 laws in nine states, I find that legislator...

It is common in research on representation to estimate a variable called “responsiveness,” the correlation between policy outcomes and public opinion. Responsiveness so measured is a necessary feature of representation, but theoretical research has shown that there is no logical basis for...

This paper uses recent regulations that have required some companies to increase the number of outside directors on their boards to generate estimates of the effect of board independence on performance that are largely free from endogeneity problems. Our main finding is that the effectiveness of...

New government spending must be approved by a referendum of citizens in many Swiss cantons. This decisionmaking procedure seems like a simple way to address citizen-legislator agency problems, but little systematic evidence is available concerning its effect on spending outcomes. We estimate...

Many organizations attempt to manage agency problems not with incentive contracts but by keeping the principal involved in the decision process, that is, by limiting delegation. This paper develops a model to investigate the economics of several decision processes that are commonly used to set...