This paper analyses the dynamic problem faced by a monopolist …rm that produces a durable good (in the primary market) and also participates in the market for complementary goods and services (the aftermarket). Considering the possibility of network effects in both markets, we investigate the...

We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible. Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. When preferences are strict, Gale's top trading cycle algorithm finds the unique core allocation. When preferences are not...

The concept of Ambiguity designates those situations where the information available to the decision maker is insufficient to form a probabilistic view of the world. Thus, it has provided the motivation for departing from the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) paradigm. Yet, the formalization of...

This paper suggests Monte Carlo multiple test procedures which are provably valid in finite samples. These include combination methods originally proposed for independent statistics and further improvements which formalize statistical practice. We also adapt the Monte Carlo test method to...

We propose a new criterion which reflects both the concern for welfare (utility) and the concern for rights in the evaluation of economic development paths. The concern for rights is captured by a pre-ordering over combinations of thresholds (floors or ceilings on various quantitative...

Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving options to parents while maintaining diversity, often enforced by setting feasibility constraints with hard upper and lower bounds for each student type. We demonstrate that there might not exist assignments that satisfy standard fairness and...

An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategyproof if misreporting one’s preference never produces a social ordering that is strictly between the original ordering...

Let E be a class of event. Conditionally Expected Utility decision makers are decision makers whose conditional preferences %E, E 2 E, satisfy the axioms of Subjective Expected Utility theory (SEU). We extend the notion of unconditional preference that is conditionally EU to unconditional...

I study long-term financial contracts between lenders and borrowers in the absence of perfect enforceability and when both parties are credit constrained. Borrowers repeatedly have projects to undertake and need external financing. Lenders can commit to contractual agreements whereas borrowers...