In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we study whether the moral evaluation of … tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the … opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to those who cannot evade. The detection probability …

In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we study whether the moral evaluation of … tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the … opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to those who cannot evade. The detection probability …

In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we study whether the moral evaluation of … tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the … opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to those who cannot evade. The detection probability …

In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we study whether the moral evaluation of … tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the … opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to those who cannot evade. The detection probability …

Tax enforcement can be prohibitively costly when market transactions and participants are difficult to observe. Evasion …