We decompose the representative agent into her manager, worker and rentier selves. The criterion is the information set of each of the 'incarnations' at every stage of a repeated game. The rentier's information set includes anticipating information while the information set of the other agents...

We provide an explicit derivation of the conjecture that due to the asymmetric information that characterizes the relationship between bank and borrower monetary policy will be less than fully expansionary.

The institutional combination of illiquid assets and demand deposit banking is regarded as vulnerable to collapse because of the impatience of depositors. We suggest that the mechanism of fully backed central bank money is a means of redress.

We examine solutions in which neither player is worse off from the leadership of one in a policy maker-public game. The loop model of dynamic games is used. Outcome space is dotted with equivalence classes of solutions. The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) results and their New...

We propose a simple framework within which to examine the problem of policy coordination between two central banks. The context is the various components of a broad measure of the money supply. Consider two central banks, one'monetarist' and the other 'Keynesian'. In each economy there is...