the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at …

We introduce the game in cover function form, which is a bargaining game of sequential offers for endogenous … network is defined as an equilibrium outcome of a game in cover function form. Our results bridge the two strands of …

; Cover Function ; Bargaining ; Symmetric Game ; Network … the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at …

the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at …

coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining …

stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a standard non-cooperative bargaining model. Players' values are monotonically … negotiation strategies: the equilibrium value is the Nash bargaining solution when no bilateral coalitions form; the Shapley value …

This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn … among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also … covers models of group and network formation by farsighted players and in dynamic contexts. The chapter concludes with a …

We analyze a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011) bargaining game: ex-ante homogeneous players … sequential network bargaining. Assuming patient players, we provide a complete characterization of networks being pairwise (Nash … form an undirected network with explicit linking costs anticipating expected equilibrium payoffs from the subsequent …

We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can … communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out … their communication links with upfront transfers. The main theorem characterizes a condition on network structures for …

We analyze a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011) bargaining game: ex-ante homogeneous players … form costly undirected links anticipating expected equilibrium payoffs from the subsequent network bargaining. Assuming … are not even singularly pairwise stable. As an important implication, this reveals the diversity of possible bargaining …