We propose an equilibrium concept, the Robust Nash equilibrium (RNE), that combines the best-reply rationality and the first mover invariance condition. The single-stage 2x2 symmetric information game G is transformed into sequential two-stage games with two sub-trees: STA has the row player...

We investigate the effects of two accountability measures on the decisions of the local governments under decentralization. Using a panel of Philippine municipalities and cities in three election years, we find that term limits have negative but weak effects on the provision of health insurance...

Using a panel dataset from cities and municipalities in the Philippines in 2001, 2004 and 2007, we investigate whether yardstick competition

Using a panel dataset from cities and municipalities in the Philippines in 2001, 2004 and 2007, we investigate whether yardstick competition -- measured here as the average spending and revenues of surrounding jurisdictions in the same province -- influence local government fiscal decisions. For...

We investigate the effects of two accountability measures on the decisions of the local governments under decentralization. Using a panel of Philippine municipalities and cities in three election years, we find that term limits have negative but weak effects on the provision of health insurance...

We propose an equilibrium concept, the Robust Nash equilibrium (RNE), that combines the best-reply rationality and the "first mover invariance" condition. The single-stage 2x2 symmetric information game G is transformed into sequential two-stage games with two sub-trees: STA has the row player...

We propose an equilibrium concept, the Robust Nash equilibrium (RNE), that combines the best-reply rationality and the "first mover invariance" condition. The single-stage 2x2 symmetric information game G is transformed into sequential two-stage games with two sub-trees: STA has the row player...