We demonstrate that one should not expect convergence of the proposals to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium offer in standard ultimatum games. First, imposing strict experimental control of the behavior of the receiving players and focusing on the behavior of the proposers, we show...

Notwithstanding the recognized importance of traders’ expectations in characterizing the observed market dynamics, for instance the formation of speculative bubbles and crashes on financial markets, little attention has been devoted so far by economists to a rigorous study of expectation...

In the Review of Economic Studies, Morgan (2000) proposed that targeted self-funding lotteries could be used as a method of increasing voluntary contributions to public goods. In the same issue, Morgan and Sefton (2000) tested the theoretical predictions in a laboratory experiment and found...

The paper develops a theory of biases in decision making. Discovering a strategy for solving a game is a complex problem that may be solved by decomposition; a player decomposing a problem into many simple sub-problems may easily identify the optimal solution to each sub-problem: however it is...

Inspired by Karl Polanyi’s writings on three allocation modes, namely reciprocity, exchange and redistribution, we first tested a reciprocity ring with ten players. The baseline treatment, with no possibility of socialisation, displayed very low levels of allocative efficiency. Consistently...