This paper studies the performance of four market protocols with egard to allocative efficiency and other performance criteria such as volume or volatility. We examine batch auctions, continuous double auctions, specialist dealerships, and a hybrid of these last two. All protocols are...

As the information relative to endowments, costs and preferences is dispersed among many agents, the quality of resource allocation depends on the ability of markets to communicate information inside the economic system. Because information is transferred through negotiation and transaction...

I study a hybrid over-the-counter (OTC) market structure in which traders have the choice of obtaining an asset from dealers either in a bilateral market or on an electronic trading platform. In a hybrid market (HM), turnover is higher and traders are better off than in a pure bilateral market...

This paper experimentally tests the effectiveness of three crowdsourced signaling mechanisms on their ability to resolve an asymmetric information problem over product quality for a set of consumers. Motivated by naturally occurring environments, the first mechanism allowed experimental subjects...

This paper comprehensively explores the compelling framework encompassing Opportunity Econophysics, Opportunity Cones, Conscious Agents, and the Traces of the Conscious Dimension within the context of economic systems. The interdisciplinary nature of this framework integrates concepts from...

We devise a tractable model to study the buyer's bid double auction (BBDA) that allows correlated signals and interdependent values/costs. We demonstrate that simple, easily calculated equilibria exist in small markets. We prove that the incentive for strategic behavior vanishes at a O (1/η)...

Many internet auction sites implement ascending-bid, second-price auctions. Empirically, last minute or quot;latequot; bidding is frequently observed in quot;hard-closequot; but not in quot;soft-closequot; versions of these auctions. In this paper, we introduce an independent private-value...

Agent-based simulations are performed to study adaptive learning in the context of asymmetric first-price auctions. Non-linearity of the Nash equilibrium strategies is used to investigate the effect of task complexity on adaptive learning by varying the degree of approximation the agents can...

We examine auction design in a context where symmetrically informed adaptive agents with common valuations learn to bid for a good. Despite the absence of private valuations, asymmetric information, or risk aversion, bidder strategies do not converge to the Bertrand–Nash equilibrium strategies...

We propose an agent-based computational model to investigate sequential Dutch auctions with particular emphasis on markets for perishable goods and we take as an example wholesale fish markets. Buyers in these markets sell the fish they purchase on a retail market. The paper provides an original...