We introduce three definitions. First, we let a basement be a set of nodes and actions that supports at least one assessment. Second, we derive from an arbitrary basement its implied plausibility (i.e. infinite-relative-likelihood) relation among the game's nodes. Third, we say that this...

The nodes of an extensive-form game are commonly specified as sequences of actions. Rubinstein calls such nodes histories. We find that this sequential notation is superfluous in the sense that nodes can also be specified as sets of actions. The only cost of doing so is to rule out games with...

Second price allpay auctions (wars of attritions) have an evolutionarily stable equilibrium in pure strategies if valuations are private information. I show that for any level of uncertainty there exists a pure deviation strategy close to the equilibrium strategy such that for some valuations...

In theoretical analyses on terrorism and the media, the structure of the media market has thus far been neglected. The present paper adopts a multi-sided market framework in order to explore the ways in which the markets for terrorism, advertising, and the media influence each other. Although...

The traditional model of sequential decision making, for instance, in extensive form games, is a tree. Most texts define a tree as a connected directed graph without loops and a distinguished node, called the root. But an abstract graph is not a domain for decision theory. Decision theory...

Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible...

With politician preferences over policy outcomes, the effect of a contribution cap with monetary penalties for exceeding the cap is starkly different from the case with an indifferent politician. In contrast to Kaplan and Wettstein (AER, 2006) and Gale and Che (AER, 2006), a cap is never neutral...

We study noncooperative models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods. We focus on interior equilibria in which neither agent is bound by non negativity constraints, establishing the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. While adding-up and...

We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public...

We study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary model. We provide results...