In this article, the authors show that blockchain can help in reaching the goals of antitrust law in situations where the rule of law does not (fully) apply. They detail what needs to be done to this end, from both a technical and legal standpoint

This paper provides a comprehensive econometric framework for the empirical analysis of countervailing power. It encompasses the two main features of pricing schemes in business-to-business relationships: nonlinear price schedules and bargaining over rents. Disentangling them is critical to the...

This paper presents a model of collusive bargaining networks. Given a status quo network, game is played in two stages: in the first stage, pairs of sellers form the network by signing two-sided contracts that allow sellers to use connections of other sellers; in the second stage, sellers and...

This paper provides a comprehensive econometric framework for the empirical analysis of buyer power. It encompasses the two main features of pricing schemes in business-to-business relationships: nonlinear price schedules and bargaining over rents. Disentangling them is critical to the empirical...

This paper studies an industry where firms can choose to provide open or closed platforms. Open, as opposed to closed, platforms are extendable so that third-party producers can develop extensions for them. Building on a two-sided market model, I show that firms might prefer to commit to keeping...

Onlineplattformen spielen zwar für Deutschland bislang eine geringere Rolle als für die USA, dennoch ist absehbar, dass diese Geschäftsmodelle auch hier an Bedeutung gewinnen werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund bewertet dieser Beitrag die vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie im Rahmen...

In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good...

This paper seeks to extend the standard assumption concerning incomplete contracts (New Institutional Economics). It is based on a very specific market transaction, within which parties can not affect the market structure. Instead, referring to transaction as introduced by John R. Commons, we...