We model how the choices by students to “rush” a fraternity, and the choices by a fraternity of whom to admit, interact with the signals that firms receive about student productivities to determine labor market outcomes. Both the fraternity and students care about future wages and fraternity...

We model how student choices to rush a fraternity, and fraternity admission choices, interact with signals firms receive about student productivities to determine labor-market outcomes. The fraternity and students value wages and fraternity socializing values. We provide sufficient conditions...

We model how student choices to rush a fraternity, and fraternity admission choices, interact with signals firms receive about student productivities to determine labor-market outcomes. The fraternity and students value wages and fraternity socializing values. We provide sufficient conditions...

We develop a model of strategic grade determination by universities distinguished by their distributions of student academic abilities. Universities choose grading standards to maximize total wages of graduates. Job placement and wages hinge on a firm's productivity assessment given a student's...

I study the institution of avoiding to hire one’s school own PhD graduates for assistant professorships. I argue that this institution is necessary to create better incentives for researchers to incorporate new information in studies, facilitating the convergence to asymptotic learning of the...