A commodity is shared between some individuals; some selection procedure is used to choose allocations. In order to reflect that laws and rules than allocations are implemented and that they involve an element of randomness because of incomplete information, selection procedures are taken to be...

We consider a connection networks model. Every agent has a demand in the form of pairs of locations she wants connected, and a willingness to pay for connectivity. A planner aims at implementing a welfare maximizing network and allocating the resulting cost, but information is asymmetric: agents...

For n-person bargaining problems the family of proportional solutions (introduced and characterized by Kalai) is generalized to bargaining problems with non-convex payoff sets. The so-called “efficient proportional solutions”are characterized axiomatically using natural extensions of the...

In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear-quadratic setup we show that the...