We present a preliminary model of the within-season behavior of a fishery regulated by a total allowable catch constraint and season closure. An individual's catch depends on where he/she deploys effort and on the effort deployment decisions of other harvesters such that catch per unit effort is...

ITQ regulation relies on a decentralized market mechanism and a single price to allocate access to a stock of fish. The resulting allocation will not be fully efficient if the stock being allocated is heterogeneous or if there are potential gains from centralized coordination of harvesting...

During 2002-2004 a voluntary, profit sharing harvesters' co-operative was allowed to operate in the Chignik Salmon fishery in Alaska. Regulators split the fishery's total allowable catch between the co-op and independent harvesters. Our economic model predicts that the co-op would centrally...

An ITQ System that relies on a single price to allocate harvest rights will not be fully efficient unless the stock in question is uniform in terms of its economic value. Variations in the location or density of portions of a stock can give rise to corresponding variations in value, leading...

We adapt the concept of a conservation easement to a marine environment and explore its use to achieve conservation goals. Although marine environments generally are not owned, those who use them for commercial fishing often are regulated. These regulations grant harvesters rights to use marine...