This paper explores two models of an economy in which contracts are exchanged. In the first model, contracts are exchanged on a competitive market in which traders' expectations concerning conditions that prevail within specific markets adjust until markets 'clear.' In the second model, contract...

This paper is concerned with decentralized models of market equilibrium in which the primary interest lies in the nature of the institutions that govern trade. There are two separate branches in this literature. In the first, the institutions that govern trade are taken to be given exogenously....

A dynamic trading problem is examined in which a monopsonistic employer hires workers with private information. The employer chooses between two mutually exclusive outcomes. In the mar ket outcome, the employer offers long-term contracts and information is conveyed entirely through...

A competitive economy is studied in which sellers offer alternative direct mechanisms to buyers who have correlated private information about their valuations. In contrast to the monopoly case where sellers charge entry fees and extract all buyers' surplus, it is shown that in the unique...

In this paper, a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an infinite number of buyers and sellers, all of whom differ according to their valuation for the single indivisible object being traded. A competitive distribution of auctions is such that no seller...

This note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple competition are robust and equilibria in mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria with simple competition provided an appropriate no-externalities assumption holds. This note provides counter...