The main purpose is to prove the supermodularity (convexity) property of a cooperative game arising from an economical situation. The underlying oligopoly situation is based on a linear inverse demand function as well as linear cost functions for the participating firms. The characteristic...

The standard win-stay, lose-shift behavior strategy in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game prescribes the players that win and lose in a current game round to keep and to change, respectively, their current actions, in the next round. Winning and losing are understood as receiving one of two...

This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters [2005] supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization.

Discrete-time game-theoretic models related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) are investigated. There are some players (countries or fishing firms) which harvest the fish stock. Power population's growth function and logarithmic players' profits are considered.We derive the...

A game-theoretic model of territorial environmental production under Cournot competition is studied. The process is modeled as cooperative differential game. The stable distribution mechanism of the common cooperative benefit among players is proposed. We proved that the cooperative total stock...

The egalitarian solution for the class of convex TU games was defined by Dutta and Ray [1989] and axiomatized by Dutta 1990. An extension of this solution — the egalitarian split-off set (ESOS) — to the class of non-levelled NTU games is proposed. On the class of TU games it coincides with...

This study reconsiders a duopoly model with advertisement introduced earlier by Ahmed, Agiza and Hassan [1999]. It demonstrates three major findings. The first is that the model can be destabilized via either flip bifurcation or Hopf bifurcation. The second is that a half-pitchfork bifurcation...

We give a non-cooperative and an axiomatic characterization of the Average Lexicographic value (AL-value) on the class of balanced games. The AL-value is a single-valued solution for balanced TU-games. It is defined as the average of lexicographic maximum of the core of the game with respect to...

Stackelberg-like games show a situation where there is a clear advantage in moving first. In a thought provoking article, Bagwell [1995] shows that this advantage may not be robust against imperfect observations of the first move. We explore these ideas in the context of forward induction in...

In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo [2002] derive collusive equilibria, where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the hard close...