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Evolutionary stability of first price auctions
Louge, Fernando; Riedel, Frank - 2010
This paper studies the evolutionary stability of the unique Nash equilibrium of a first price sealed bid auction. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium is not asymptotically stable under payoff monotonic dynamics for arbitrary initial popu- lations. In contrast, when the initial population...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272558
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Evolutionary stability of prospect theory preferences
Rieger, Marc Oliver - 2009
We demonstrate that in simple 2 X 2 games (cumulative) prospect theory preferences can be evolutionarily stable, i.e. a … population of players with prospect theory preferences can not be invaded by more rational players. This holds also if … is not optimal in usual decision problems. -- prospect theory ; existence of Nash equilibria ; evolutionary stability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008736324
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Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics
Balkenborg, Dieter; Hofbauer, Josef; Kuzmics, Christoph - 2011
correspondence. -- Evolutionary game theory ; best response dynamics ; CURB sets ; persistent retracts ; asymptotic stability ; Nash …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009231404
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Unbeatable imitation
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - 2012
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule 'imitate-if-better' can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544162
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An Indirect Evolutionary Justification of Risk Neutral Bidding in Fair Division Games
Güth, Werner - 2020
We justify risk neutral equilibrium bidding in commonly known fair division games with incompleteinformation by an evolutionary setup postulating (i) minimal common knowledge, (ii) optimal responses to conjectural beliefs how others behave and (iii) evolutionary selection of conjectural beliefs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848843
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English auctions and Walrasian equilibria with multiple objects : a dynamic approach
Ma, Jinpeng - 1997 - This version March 1, 1997
This paper studies the English (progressive) auction for an exchange economy with multiple objects. The English auction is a tatonnement process and lasts multiple rounds. It is modeled as a sequence of round games. Each round game is a normal form game in which an agent's strategies are his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576990
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Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching : the case of private values
Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2010
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967
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Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Fixed and Random Matching : The Case of Private Values
Saran, Rene - 2010
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142432
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Supply function equilibria of pay-as-bid auctions
Holmberg, Pär - 2009
This paper characterizes the Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid (discriminatory), divisible-good, procurement auction. Demand by the auctioneer is uncertain as in the supply function equilibrium model. A closed form expression is derived. Existence of an equilibrium is ensured if the hazard rate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003809072
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Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)
Dubey, Pradeep (contributor); Sondermann, Dieter (contributor) - 2008
We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782307