This note applies the evolutionary dynamic of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob ( Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-65) to class coordination games that the entire population plays simultaneously. In these games, payoffs and best replies are determined by a symmary statistic of the population strategy profile...

This article considers the robustness of long run equilibria when mutation rates are not assumed to be constant over time. Particular attention is paid to the case where mutation rates decline to zero in the limit. It is found that if behaviour is ergodic, then it corresponds to the long run...

The paper is concerned with genetic algorithm learning in a cobweb economy. Besides discussing several specification details in the genetic operators, the model includes four different types of firm forecasting rules and subjects the demand side to serially correlated random shocks. The main...

A hybrid of a model of economic equilibrium in two markets and a social game is formed. The link between the two is established through a social norm which conditions correct social behavior on economic variables and therefore distorts the economic equilibrium allocation. The initial endowment...

"[C]oncentration on a single firm and the reaction of its owner is not the appropriate route to the theory of production; on the contrary, it is likely to be misleading…In the current literature, this preoccupation with the single firm rather than with the interrelatedness of firms in the...

Alfred Marshall has traditionally been listed alongside pioneering 'neoclassical' economists. In this volume Neil Hart challenges this view, illuminating the ambiguities within Marshall's work, and exploring his reconciliation of two modes of thinking, equilibrium economics and evolutionary...