We show that in situations of team production, the associated externality between workers can be partially internalized via the delegation of authority of contracting rights, thus improving the overall efficiency of organizations. A delegated structure provides further incentives to individuals...

We show that in situations of team production, the associated externality between workers can be partially internalized via the delegation of authority of contracting rights, thus improving the overall efficiency of organizations. A delegated structure provides further incentives to individuals...

We analyze a bargaining protocol recently proposed in the literature vis-à-vis unconstrained negotiation. This new mechanism extracts gains from trade inherent in the differing valuation of two parties towards various issues where conflict exists. We assess the role of incomplete vs. complete...

Legislators trade influence to attain approval of their most preferred bills. The classical example is found in pork barrel politics with concentrated benefits and diffuse costs where logrolling agreements involving two (or more) legislators can load costs onto legislators excluded from the...

In Conflict Resolution situations where two parties with opposed preferences need to make a number of decisions simultaneously,we propose a simple mechanism that endows agents with a certain number of votes that can be distributed freely across issues. Its novelty, and appeal, is that it allows...

Following Pillar 3 of the new Basel Capital Adequacy Proposals (Basel II), we analyse the effects of disclosure in the banking sector in a stylised setting of delegated portfolio management. We first consider the interaction between the shareholder and the manager of a bank - the manager has to...