myopic or not able to commit themselves to sustainable policies or costs of reducing emissions are too high, strategic … future treaty. Although no player will rationally reduce emissions on its own, investments in R&D by at least one player can … change the strategic situation of negotiations to control emissions: Emission abatement costs will decrease so that a treaty …

myopic or not able to commit themselves to sustainable policies or costs of reducing emissions are too high, strategic … future treaty. Although no player will rationally reduce emissions on its own, investments in R&D by at least one player can … change the strategic situation of negotiations to control emissions: Emission abatement costs will decrease so that a treaty …

myopic or not able to commit themselves to sustainable policies or costs of reducing emissions are too high, strategic … future treaty. Although no player will rationally reduce emissions on its own, investments in R&D by at least one player can … change the strategic situation of negotiations to control emissions: Emission abatement costs will decrease so that a treaty …

This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly …

levels of emissions. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides on its level of adaptation non co-operatively. We … solve this game for two models. For both, it is assumed that damages are linear with respect to emissions which guarantee … that emissions are strategic complements in the second stage of the game. However, for the first model adaptation reduces …

-cooperatively upon its level of energy production. Emissions depend on the decisions made regarding investment and production. If a … country decides to develop a breakthrough technology in the second stage, its emissions will be zero in the third stage. For … enough to justify the development of a breakthrough technology that eliminates emissions completely, and if technology …