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Decision makers lacking crucial specialist know-how often consult with better informed but biased experts. In our model …, and to situations with multiple experts and uncertainty about the size of the expert's bias. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430094
Two experts make yes/no predictions about whether an event, such as an economic crisis, will occur. They receive … ultimately convey. The experts may care about both absolute and relative performance. We show that when both experts receive … such experts. We find that, without the possibility of huge transfers, society's ability to extract good advice or even to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008695841
Decision makers lacking crucial specialist know-how often consult with better informed but biased experts. In our model … the expert’s bias and the decision maker’s prior about the underlying state, three kinds of equilibrium behavior occur. In … each case equilibrium consists of separating and pooling segments, and the decision maker takes the expert’s preferred …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465843
Professional experts offer advice with the objective of appearing well informed. Their ability is evaluated on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190067
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822063
We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N ≥ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in L<sub>p</sub>-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012859339
We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N ≥ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123363
In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M ≥ N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012436059
We consider imperfectly discriminating, common-value, all-pay auctions (or contests) where some players know the value of the prize, others do not. We show that if the prize is always of positive value, then all players are active in equilibrium. If the prize is of value zero with positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014055053