There is a large literature on the impact of price-matching and price-beating guarantees (low-price guarantees) on competition. Existing studies typically employ static models and the results are sensitive to modeling assumptions such as the type of guarantees, consumer hassle costs and consumer...

We model a player's uncertainty about other players' strategy choices as smooth probability distributions over their strategy sets. We call a strategy profile (strictly) robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence (all sequences) of strategy...

This paper generalizes the classical duopoly collusion model by first deriving a new marginal cost curve. It then proves that freely colluded duopolists produce more joint output and enjoy larger joint profit than a monopolist, so they have higher incentive to collude. It also distinguishes free...

We develop a theoretical model to analyse the e ect of competition on the conflict of interest arising from the issuer pay compensation model of the credit rating industry. We nd that relative to monopoly, rating agencies are more likely to inflate ratings under competition, resulting in lower...

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate if-better'' can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a...

Theoretical literature on collusion has focused on a specific formulation of payoff fluctuations, namely by demand shocks, and showed that payoff fluctuations are bad for collusion. Introducing general payoff fluctuations, we show that (i) payoff fluctuations may strictly reduce the minimum...

One of the most frequently cited articles in the economics literature of this millennium is that on platform competition in two-sided markets by Rochet and Tirole (2003). Yet it is probably also among the least understood. I have several reasons to think so. One is that the two-sided market...

We analyze firms' incentives to acquire information about market demandin a differentiated goods duopoly setting. We find two distinct benefitsof having better information. Firstly, with better information, eachfirm can better match its price to demand. This benefit is decreasingin the level of...

This article builds a simple model of oligopoly and uses it to make a detailed characterization of the equilibrium prices; quantities; mark-ups; price elasticities of market demand; price elasticities of residual demand; and welfare, all in terms of the parameters of the model. This is done under...

This paper proposes a spatial model of imperfect competition in markets with selection to investigate whether imperfect competition exacerbates or offsets inefficiencies caused by selection. We find that no degree of imperfect competition achieves the first-best efficient allocation. This holds...