Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are ε-best reply dynamics where ε is the maximal regret, which vanishes with time. This allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of known results on convergence of no-regret dynamics...

Consider a repeated game where all players follow no-regret strategies by reinforcing the actions that they regret not having played enough in the past. We show that a resulting no-regret dynamic approaches in the long run a best-response dynamic and leads to its invariant sets: rest points...

We study the experimentation dynamics of a decision maker (DM) in a two-armed bandit setup (Bolton and Harris [1999]), where the agent holds ambiguous beliefs regarding the distribution of the return process of one arm and is certain about the other one. The DM entertains Multiplier preferences...

This paper investigates the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in finitely repeated games. Each player assigns subjective payoff assessments to his own actions and chooses the action which has the highest assessment at each of his information sets. After receiving payoffs,...

In the beginning of the second book of his Politeia (Republic) Plato in passage 2.358e-359a-c raises the issue of the administration of justice as a means of motivating people to behave fairly regarding their relationships and when cooperating with each other because, at the end, this is...

In this paper, we present a model of finitely repeated games in which players can strategically make use of objective ambiguity. In each round of a finite rep- etition of a finite stage-game, in addition to the classic pure and mixed actions, players can employ objectively ambiguous actions by...

How is cooperation without immediate reciprocity sustained in a long term relationship? We study the case of two players in continuous time who have privately observable opportunities to provide favors, and where the arrival of these opportunities is a Poisson process. Favors provided by a...

We study an economic decision problem where the actors are two rms and the Antitrust Authority whose main task is to monitor and prevent rms potential anti-competitive behaviour. The Antitrust Au- thority's decision process is modelled using a Bayesian network whose relational structure and...

Multiple long run players play one amongst multiple possible stage games in each period. They observe and recall past play and are aware of the current stage game being played, but are maximally uncertain about the future evolution of stage games. This setup is termed an uncertain repeated game....

We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player follows such a strategy, then the joint mixed strategy profiles converge, almost surely, to a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. The procedure requires very little in terms of players' information about...