Showing 61 - 69 of 69
We offer a simple variant of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin Model that explains how a developing country, by opening up to trade with a large capital-abundant economy, can be induced to shift resources into more capital-intensive production than that which it was producing in autarky. As a result,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008681202
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005270225
Antidumping (AD) duties are calculated as the difference between the foreign firm’s product price in the export market and some definition of "normal" or "fair" value, often the foreign firm’s product price in its own market. Additionally, AD laws allow for recalculation of these AD duties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005635128
In this paper strategic R&D policy is analysed, where a firm and a firm compete in a third country with vertically differentiated ( and ) products. If the product market is under price competition, the high-tech (low-tech) firm's government has an incentive to tax (subsidize) its domestic firm's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005466996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006816901
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005891140
This paper uses recursive methods to characterize the payoff frontier of self-enforcing trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size. We show that at points on the frontier where only one country's incentive constraint binds, the efficient agreement will be a non-stationary one that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005672862
International trade disputes often involve the WTO as a third party that generates impartial opinions of potential violations when countries receive imperfect and private signals of violations. To identify the role that the WTO plays in enforcing trade agreements, this paper first characterizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990976
International trade disputes often involve the WTO as a third party that generates impartial opinions of potential violations when countries receive imperfect and private signals of violations. To identify the role that the WTO plays in enforcing trade agreements, this paper first characterizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991080