In real life, punishment is often implemented only insofar as punishers are entitled to punish and punishees deserve to be punished. We provide an experimental test for this principle of legitimacy in the framework of a public goods game, by comparing it with a classic (unrestricted) punishment...

We experimentally investigate cooperation within a finitely repeated public goods game framework where peer punishment is possible but, unlike previous work, in each round access to sanctioning power is exclusively awarded to the group’s top contributor. We compare this mechanism with a...

Is culture an important variable to explain whether groups can successfully provide public goods? A wealth of empirical evidence on both industrialized and developing countries shows that cooperation levels decrease in the presence of ethnic divisions. Although several laboratory works deal with...

Social identity theory has become increasingly important for economists. I discuss the contribution of Van Bavel and Packer's "The Power of Us" in light of what economists (especially experimental ones) can learn from their research.

Empirical evidence about innovation is doubtful in showing incumbent firms' and new entrants' attitude toward radical innovations. Moreover, theoretical works exhibit divergent conclusions when investigating the incentives to innovate. Our paper emphasizes the importance of distinguishing...