Experimental studies have shown that trust and reciprocity are effective in increasing efficiency when complete contracting is infeasible. One example is the study by Berg et al. (1995) of the investment game. In this game the person who receives the investment is the one who may reward the...

The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how 'the pie' changes over time, and whether the proposer in a given round has ultimatum power. We study experimentally eight such bargaining games. Each game is once repeated before moving on to the next one...

The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how "the pie'' changes over time, and whether the proposer in an early round has ultimatum power. We experimentally study eight such games. Each game is once repeated before being followed by the next one, which...

Our study considers the question of training in firms using an experimental laboratory approach. We investigate the following questions : What conditions, excluding external certification, will bring workers and employers to cooperate and share a rent generated by the workers’ training? What...

Our study considers the question of training in firms using an experimental laboratory approach. We investigate the following questions : What conditions, excluding external certification, will bring workers and employers to cooperate and share a rent generated by the workers' training? What...

Experimental studies have shown that trust and reciprocity are effective in increasing efficiency when complete contracting is infeasible. One example is the study by Berg et al. (1995) of the investment game. In this game the person who receives the investment is the one who may reward the...