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Scoring rules and preference restrictions : the Strong Borda Paradox revisited
Kamwa, Eric; Valognes, Fabrice - In: Revue d'économie politique 127 (2017) 3, pp. 375-395
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011718334
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Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
Alemante, Fasil; Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 62 (2016) 4, pp. 765-783
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011646478
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It is difficult to tell if there is a Condorcet spanning tree
Darmann, Andreas - In: Mathematical methods of operations research 84 (2016) 1, pp. 93-104
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673439
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An endogeneous scoring rule
Herrero Blanco, Carmen - 2016 - Version: November 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011815270
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Condorcets Irrtum : warum nur ein starker Staat die Demokratie retten kann
Molander, Per - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011928775
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Condorcet et Adam Smith : réformes économiques et progrès social au siècle des Lumières
Pisanelli, Simona - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011883912
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Nature et diffusion du savoir dans la pensée économique de Condorcet
Rieucau, Nicolas - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126362
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Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
Kamwa, Eric - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 87 (2019) 3, pp. 299-320
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012133769
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Consensus in the 2015 provincial parliament election in Styria, Austria : voting rules, outcomes, and the Condorcet paradox
Darmann, Andreas; Grundner, Julia; Klamler, Christian - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011797659
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A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economic Theory 22 (2003) 3, pp. 557-568
A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority … strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371154