This paper examines partial privatisation in a price-setting mixed duopoly model to reassess the welfare effect of production subsidies. It is shown that the result of this study is basically the same as that of the existing quantity-setting mixed market model.

This paper investigates a mixed duopoly model in which there is a state-owned firm competing with a foreign joint-stock firm. The following situation is considered. In the first period, each firm non-cooperatively decides how many it sells in the current market. In addition, each firm can hold...

This study examines a price-setting mixed duopoly with production subsidies and demonstrates that under the optimal production subsidy of each of substitutive, independent and complementary goods, profits and economic welfare are respectively identical in the three regimes of (i) a public firm...

This paper considers a mixed Cournot duopoly model comprising a private firm and a partially privatized public firm to reassess the effect of an increase in ambient charges, and compares the result of this study with that obtained from private Cournot duopoly competition. The paper demonstrates...

This paper investigates three sequential-move games with a capitalist firm, a labour-managed firm and a state-owned firm. The first game is as follows. In stage one, the capitalist firm chooses its output level. In stage two, the other firms choose their output levels simultaneously and...

This paper investigates a mixed duopoly model in which there is a state-owned firm competing with a foreign joint-stock firm. The following situation is considered. In the first period, each firm non-cooperatively decides how many it sells in the current market. In addition, each firm can hold...

This paper considers a quantity-setting oligopoly model with complementary goods where labour-managed firms are allowed to offer wage-rise contracts as a strategic commitment. The following two stages are considered. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether or not to adopt a...

Which choice will a player make if he can make one of two choices in which his own payoffs are equal, but his rival’s payoffs are not equal, i.e. one with a large payoff for his rival and the other with a small payoff for his rival? This paper introduces non-altruistic equilibria for normal...

This paper considers a Cournot oligopoly model with a concave demand function where socially concerned firms can offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment device. Each socially concerned firm maximizes its own profit plus a share of consumer surplus. The paper presents the reaction...

This paper considers a mixed triopoly model where a state-owned firm, a domestic labor-managed firm and a foreign capitalist firm are allowed to pre-install capacity as a strategic commitment device. First, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses its capacity level. None of the firms...