In this paper we distinguish between two types of white lies: those that help others at the expense of the person telling the lie, which we term <i>altruistic white lie</i>s, and those that help both others and the liar, which we term <i>Pareto white lies</i>. We find that a large fraction of participants are...

In an experiment using two consecutive trust games, we study how “cheap” signals such as promises and messages are used to restore damaged trust and encourage new trust where it did not previously exist. In these games, trustees made non-binding promises of investment-contingent returns,...

Numerous papers show how game theory can improve our understanding of literature. There is no paper, however, using experimental economics to arrive at a new understanding of a play. We fill this gap by using experimental evidence to compare the last two versions of Molière's Tartuffe. In the...

I experimentally investigate how vague language changes the nature of communication in a biased strategic information transmission game. Counterintuitively, when both precise and imprecise messages can be sent, in aggregate, senders are more accurate, and receivers trust them more than when only...

I describe ten situations in which experimental data may provide useful guidance to the study of cheap-talk games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C92, D8.

Using trust games, we study how promises and messages are used to build new trust where it did not previously exist and to rebuild damaged trust. In these games, trustees made non-binding promises of investment-contingent returns, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees...