AbstractWe construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the...

AbstractWe construct a three-country model to determine how the formation of free trade areas (FTAs) affects optimal tariffs and welfare. We find that, at constant rest of the world (ROW) tariffs, the adoption of internal free trade induces union members to reduce their external tariffs below...

AbstractThis paper uses computational techniques to assess whether or not various propositions that have been advanced as plausible in the literature on regional trade agreements may actually hold. The idea is to make probabilistic statements as to whether propositions of interest might hold,...

AbstractIn this paper we develop a three-country-three-good model of customs unions. The main result is that a sufficient condition for two countries to benefit from forming a customs union is that they are similar in the sense that their mutual trade is small. This result is obtained by...

AbstractThis paper investigates the design of trade policies in an uncertain world. Governments in each of two countries select between direct quantity controls and subsidies in an attempt to shift profits in favour of domestic, imperfectly competitive firms. The equilibrium of this bilateral...

AbstractThe following sections are included: IntroductionTariffs in a Non-Cooperative FrameworkTariffs in a Cooperative Framework: The Negotiation SetTariffs in a Cooperative Framework: The SolutionConclusionReferences

AbstractWe construct a model of customs unions in. which countries charge optimal tariffs. Customs unions internalize the externality that exists whenever two countries import the same good. Also, customs unions make several countries into one large unit with more market power. Big customs...

AbstractWe analyze voter preferences for tariffs and production subsidies. The distribution of tax revenues argument shows that voters with high direct tax burdens prefer tariffs to subsidies. The uncertainty argument demonstrates that if actual tariff and subsidy rates are chosen from the set...