We examine how people redistribute income when there is uncertainty about the role luck plays in determining opportunities and outcomes. We elicit redistribution decisions from a U.S.-representative sample who observe worker outcomes and whether luck magnified workers' effort ("lucky...

Frédéric Bastiat, himself a renowned classical libertarian, once put the construct of the state in question by proclaiming the following: "The State! What is it? Where is it? What does it do? What ought it to do? (Bastiat, 1848)" Bastiat then already had an answer for his questions, namely...

This paper reports an experiment designed to elicit social preferences over income compensation schemes, where income differences between subjects have two independent components: one due to chosen effort and the other due to random chance. These differences can be compensated through social...

We study optimal climate policy in a global economy where regions differ in wealth and climate vulnerability. Carbon emissions from production lead to output losses, and there is a technology for emissions absorption. We provide an aggregation result: the model with heterogeneity can be cast...

The economic prescription for climate change is clear: price carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas emissions to internalize climate damages. In practice, a variety of political economy constraints prevent the introduction of a carbon price equal to the full social cost of emissions. This...

We develop a model of optimal carbon taxation and redistribution taking into account horizontal equity concerns by considering heterogeneous energy efficiencies. By deriving first- and second-best rules for policy instruments including carbon taxes, transfers and energy subsidies, we then...

The paper looks at the global environment as a public good and as a sink for CO2-emissions. It discusses problems to be solved in institutional arrangements to protect global environmental media and looks at criteria for allocating the costs of emission reduction and emission rights. It analyzes...

This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner?s dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large...

Should climate policy rely on a price of Carbon that is uniform across sectors? This paper studies this question from a public finance perspective. It is found that a justification for a uniform price can be given, but it relies on strong assumptions, among them indifference with respect to the...