This paper explores the dynamic dependence properties of a Levy process, the Variance Gamma, which has non Gaussian marginal features and non Gaussian dependence. In a static context, such a non Gaussian dependence should be represented via copulas. Copulas, however, are not able to capture the...

We define an algebro-topological concept of essential map and we use it to prove several results in the theory of general equilibrium and nash equilibrium refinement.

This paper considers games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously with the same agent. We introduce a new class of revelation mechanisms that, although it does not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, it facilitates the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes...

This paper examines the consequences of child support enforcement on custodial mothers' consumption decisions. We model the interaction in separated couples as a repeated game between the noncustodial father and the custodial mother who share a common good: the child. The mother exclusively...

This paper studies the provision of a public good between two agents under lack of commitment and applies it to the problem of children's consumption in separated couples, where children are considered to be public goods. The custodial mother controls the child's consumption, whereas the father...

Information regarding economic fundamentals is widely dispersed in society, is only imperfectly aggregated through prices or other indicators of aggregate activity, and can not be centralized by the government or any other institution. In this paper we seek to identify policies that can improve...

Why many large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are becoming multinational entities? What are the welfare implications of this integration of markets for development donations? To answer these questions, we build a simple two-country model with horizontally differentiated NGOs competing...

How is cooperation without immediate reciprocity sustained in a long term relationship? We study the case of two players in continuous time who have privately observable opportunities to provide favors, and where the arrival of these opportunities is a Poisson process. Favors provided by a...

We study testable implications for the dynamics of consumption and income of models in which first best allocations are not achieved because of a moral hazard problem with hidden saving. We show that in this environment agents typically achieve more insurance than that obtained under self...

We provide sufficient conditions for the validity of the first-order approach for two period dynamic moral hazard problems, where the agent can save and borrow secretly. We show that in addition to the concavity requirements for the standard moral hazard problem, non-increasing absolute risk...