type="main" <p>Are anti-establishment mass media really useful in preventing politicians from behaving dishonestly? This paper models the direction of media bias, and shows that the probability of a dishonest action by an incumbent is higher (than that in the case of no media bias) if and only if...</p>

This note shows that a unique mixed Nash equilibrium obtains when there are three voters in Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1983) costly voting game under complete information. Experimental investigation of this result might be interesting.

This paper provides two characterizations of the retailer’s markup relative to the manufacturer’s markup in vertical relationships with homogeneous manufacturers and homogeneous retailers. We first show that retailer’s relative markup is equal to the ratio of the retail pass-through to the...

We study the price and welfare effects of a merger of firms producing unidirectional complements: a firm is producing a product (called an optional good) that is valuable only if it is consumed with the other product (called a base good) produced by another firm. Under the assumption that there...

Data from the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) show that self-employment (nonfarm or nonprofessional) accounts for as high as 7 percent of all yearly labor supplies by young white males (ages 20-39 in years 1979-2000). On the other hand, nearly 30 percent of...

Are anti-establishment mass media really useful in preventing politicians from behaving dishonestly? This paper proposes a voting model for analyzing how differences in the direction of media bias affect politicians' behavior. In particular, the probability of corruption by an incumbent is...

This note shows that a unique mixed Nash equilibrium obtains when there are three voters in Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1983) costly voting game under complete information. Experimental investigation of this result might be interesting.

This paper analyses monopolistic third-degree price discrimination in the presence of consumption externalities within two separate markets. Assuming linear inverse demands, we investigate an associated change in social welfare (the sum of the consumers' surpluses and the producer's profit) with...

This paper proposes a method to estimate relative ministerial weights in parliamentary democracies. Specifically, our method combines a bargaining model of government formation with maximum likelihood estimation. The data required for estimation are who formateurs are, what each party’s...